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Several rulings of the ECJ regarding the cross-border mobility of companies, from Daily Mail
to Vale and National Grid Indus, have inspired numerous authors from throughout the
European Union to discuss these judgments’ justification and relevance with regard to inter-
national corporate law and its dichotomy between the “incorporation” and the “real seat”
theory. This approach fails to understand that the Court deduces a principle of mutual
recognition from the European fundamental freedoms which, albeit originally developed
for the freedom to move goods, also applies to the freedom of establishment for companies.
This principle grants the Member States autonomy in defining qualification standards in their
capacity as country of origin, while at the same time obliging them to recognize as functionally
equivalent other Member States’ qualification standards once they become the host State for a
foreign corporation. The fundamental freedoms thus allocate competences in cross-border
situations by assigning the country of origin the competence to define and enforce qualifica-
tion standards and the host State the authority to define and enforce framework conditions.
Companies can consequently choose the country of origin within the common market whose
qualification standards they wish to fulfil and can then operate throughout the common
market under these laws. The article therefore demonstrates how European corporate
cross-border mobility is not a question of the interaction of national laws, but part and parcel
of the overall European order of fundamental freedoms and the obligations these create.
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I. Introduction
The academic analysis of European Union law and its practical application must
take into consideration that this law forms an independent legal order1 which
follows own rules and notably comprises a particular method of legal applica-
tion.2 This method differs from the application of national law in several re-
spects, for instance regarding the interpretational principle of the effet utile3.
It is thus self-evident that one must not view the Union law from the perspective
of national law, as 28 “different” Union legal orders would be the consequence.
However, a nationally predetermined perspective of this sort is common, a
phenomenon particularly distinct in the analysis of the scope and limits of the
cross-border mobility of companies. In the last years, this topic has inspired
representatives of both academia and legal practice to numerous contributions
written from the perspective of (national) corporate law or (national) law of
conflicts and that thus primarily discuss the theme in terms of how the “incor-
porationtheory”ininternationalcorporate lawhascometoreplacethe“realseat
theory”. The authors’ principal interest mostly lies in evaluating the practical
leeway that companies established under their own national law enjoy by ana-
lyzing the ECJ’s particular statements in the relevant judgments. This concep-
tion however fails to comprehend that European Union law – and thus the ECJ
whose responsibility it is to interpret this law – is independent of the categories,
“theories” and definitions of national law; it possesses its own categories and its
own terminology with which it can assess the results of the application of na-
tional law. It is the province of the European law scholarship to bring to light the
1 Fundamental ECJ ruling in case 26/62, van Gend & Loos [1963], ECR 3.
2 For a complete overview see Riesenhuber (Ed.), Europäische Methodenlehre, 2nd ed. (De
Gruyter Studium, 2010).
3 ECJ, case 9/70, Grad [1970], ECR 825 para. 5; ECJ, case 41/74, Van Duyn [1974], ECR
1337 para. 12; Potacs, “Effet utile als Auslegungsgrundsatz”, (2009) EuR, 465–487, at 466;
see Streinz, “Der ‘effet utile’ in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen
Gemeinschaften” in Due/Lutter (Ed.), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling (Baden-Baden,
1995), 1491–1510, on the meaning of the effet utile in the ECJ rulings.
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principle that pervades the ECJ’s relevant judgments – Daily Mail,4 Centros,5
Überseering,6 Inspire Art,7 Cartesio8 and most recently National Grid Indus9
and Vale10 – while analyzing the cross-border mobility of companies. Only the
comprehensionof theprinciplewill enable tofindanswers topracticalquestions
in particular cases; the opposite is not possible.
This contribution intends to explicate that the European internal market is
predominantly11 built upon the foundation of the fundamental freedoms of
European primary law and their uniform judicial interpretation in the sense of
a principle of mutual recognition. The thought that the fundamental freedoms
evidence a parallel structure is not new;12 however, the way how the principle
of mutual recognition functions has yet to be completely understood. This has
led to the misinterpretation of some ECJ judgments that lay the base for the
theory of fundamental freedoms, e.g. the Keck ruling13 regarding the free
movement of goods14 and the Daily Mail, Cartesio and National Grid Indus
judgments regarding the freedom of establishment for companies.15
It will become clear that the principle of mutual recognition can, in the context
of a company transnationally relocating its seat without changing its previous
legal form, explain the different treatment of “inbound cases” and “outbound
cases” in the case law of the ECJ.
II. Principles of the Parallel Structure of Fundamental Freedoms
Originally, the fundamental freedoms were solely interpreted as prohibiting
discrimination;16 they are thus specific manifestations of the general prohibi-
4 ECJ, case 81/87 [1988], ECR 5483.
5 ECJ, case C-212/97 [1999], ECR I-1459.
6 ECJ, case C-208/00 [2002], ECR I-9919.
7 ECJ, case C-167/01 [2003], ECR I-10155.
8 ECJ, case C-210/06 [2008], ECR I-9641.
9 ECJ, case C-371/10 [2011], ECR I-12273.
10 ECJ, case C-378/10 [2012], ECLI:EU:C:2012:440.
11 For the other core elements of the internal market’s completion founded in primary law,
to which the rules on competition (Articles 101 et seq. TFEU) belong in particular, see
Müller-Graff, in Dauses, EU-Wirtschaftsrecht, 31st supplement (2012), para. 127 et seq.
12 See Behrens, “Die Konvergenz der wirtschaftlichen Freiheiten im europäischen Ge-
meinschaftsrecht”, (1992) EuR, 145–162 and Classen, “Auf dem Weg zu einer einheit-
lichen Dogmatik der EG-Grundfreiheiten?“, (1995) EWS, 97–106 on the convergence
of the fundamental freedoms.
13 ECJ, case C-268/91 [1993], ECR I-6097.
14 See below III. 3 as well as the references in footnote 53.
15 See below III. 4 as well as the references in footnote 71.
16 Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht Band I (Springer, 2004), para. 105.
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tion of discrimination established in Article 18 TFEU.17 According to the
ECJ, discrimination arises through the application of different rules to com-
parable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations.18
This comprises both direct and indirect – i.e. open and hidden – discrimina-
tion.19
The prohibition of discrimination is inherent to all fundamental freedoms.
With respect to the freedom of establishment of companies, a provision of
national transformation law which allows companies to participate in a merger
according to that law only if they are established under the laws of that State,
therefore preventing foreign companies from participating in a merger, thus
constitutes an illegal discrimination.20 The same applies when other forms of
transformation are restricted to companies established in a domestic legal
form: while the ECJ has explicitly confirmed this for the transnational con-
version of companies,21 the same must be true for a transnational division.
The ECJ has, in the meantime, not restricted itself to this reading of the
fundamental freedoms as prohibitions of discrimination. Already in 1974
did the ECJ rule in its Dassonville judgment that the free movement of goods
not only prohibits discrimination but also comprehensively forbids any re-
striction of said freedom. In this judgment, the court defined a restriction of
the freedom to move goods as any trading rule “capable of hindering, directly
or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade”.22 This interpre-
tation of the freedom to move goods as a prohibition of restriction is para-
digmatic for the other fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, all fundamental
freedoms similarly share the problem that the restriction formula is very broad
and thus hardly functional; it thus necessitates a limitation that the ECJ under-
took – again for the free movement of goods – in its Keck judgment: the
prohibition of restriction shall only apply to product-related provisions, not
those that solely concern the selling arrangements (so-called “selling modali-
17 Teichmann, Binnenmarktkonformes Gesellschaftsrecht (De Gruyter, 2006), p. 111.
18 ECJ, case C-107/94, Asscher [1996], ECR I-3089 para. 40; ECJ, case C-80/94, Wielockx
[1995], ECR I-2493 para. 17.
19 See Teichmann, Binnenmarktkonformes Gesellschaftsrecht (De Gruyter, 2006), p. 112
regarding the delimitation; see also Frenz, Handbuch Europarecht Band I (Springer,
2004), para. 2105 et seq., who differentiates between open, hidden and indirect discrimi-
nations.
20 ECJ, case C-411/03, SEVIC [2005], ECR I-10805.
21 ECJ, case C-378/10, Vale [2012], ECLI:EU:C:2012:440. In SEVIC as well as in Vale, the
ECJ holds that there has been a restriction of the freedom of establishment, although
what actually occurs is a discrimination – see Behme, “Der grenzüberschreitende Form-
wechsel von Gesellschaften nach Cartesio und Vale”, (2012) NZG, 936–939, at 938 with
further evidence.
22 ECJ, case 8/74, Dassonville [1974], ECR 837 para. 5.
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ties”).23 This curtailment of the broad restriction formula also extends mutatis
mutandis beyond Keck to all fundamental freedoms, an extension that will be
revisited later.
Finally, all fundamental freedoms allow for restrictions to be justified. The
structure of justification is very similar as well for all freedoms: there are
written grounds of justification that the ECJ regularly interprets narrowly
and whose practical importance is thus comparably low. Public policy and
public security in particular form part of these written grounds of justification
(Articles 36, 45 para. 3, 52, 62, 65 para. 1 lit. b TFEU). Additionally, restric-
tions24 can be justified with mandatory requirements of public interest, pro-
vided that the restriction is able and necessary to achieve a certain objective
that is compatible with European Union law.25 The court established this
unwritten ground of justification in its Cassis de Dijon judgment26 concerning
the free movement of goods. Again, it applies to all fundamental freedoms in
an equal fashion.
III. The Principle of Mutual Recognition in European Primary Law
The decisive question of the modern theory of fundamental freedoms relates
to the freedoms’ scope of application. Which provisions of national law are
susceptible of being evaluated against the standard of the fundamental free-
doms as far as they prohibit restrictions? And which provisions are exempt
from this standard, thus granting the national legislator political leeway with-
out the need to justify for his policy choices? In the past years, this question
has primarily been discussed regarding Member States’ treatment of foreign
companies established under foreign laws in the light of the freedom of estab-
lishment;27 it also applies with particular urgency to the freedom to move
23 ECJ, case C-268/91, Keck [1993], ECR I-6097 para. 16 et seq.
24 Open discriminations cannot be justified with mandatory requirements of public inter-
est; see Haltern, Europarecht, 2nd ed. (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), para. 1608 et seq. for a
critical analysis of this exception.
25 The ECJ emphasizes that the objective has to conform with European law in its case C-
19/92, Kraus [1993], ECR I-1663 para. 32; a more extensive analysis can be found in
Ahlfeld, Zwingende Erfordernisse im Sinne der Cassis-Rechtsprechung des Europäischen
Gerichtshofs zu Art. 30 EGV (Nomos, 1997), p. 268; Hellwig/Behme, “Die deutsche
Unternehmensmitbestimmung im Visier von Brüssel?“, (2011) AG, 740–746, at 740 et
seq.
26 ECJ, case 120/78 [1979], ECR 649 para. 8; for a similar ruling concerning the freedom of
services, see ECJ, case 33/74, van Binsbergen [1974], ECR 1299 para. 12.
27 For an example, see Eidenmüller, in Eidenmüller (Ed.), Ausländische Kapitalgesellschaf-
ten im deutschen Recht (München, 2004), § 3 para. 10 et seq.
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capital.28 An attempt to answer the question on the basis of the ECJ case law
brings two judgments to the foreground: on the one hand, the Keck judgment
with its differentiation between product- and marketing-related provisions
that is terminologically tailored to the free movement of goods, and, on the
other hand, the Daily Mail judgment that has in the meantime been errone-
ously considered out-dated, but which the ECJ has affirmed and specified in
its Cartesio and in its National Grid Indus judgments. According to these
latter decisions, the configuration of companies by the national law of their
State of origin is a premise for their exercise of the right to free establishment.
Other points of approach for a limitation of the fundamental freedoms’ ambit
can be found in some decisions that have found national measures to be too
uncertain or indirect as to legitimately restrict the respective fundamental
freedom.29
The reach of the freedoms’ ambit can be appreciated by clarifying how the
principle of mutual recognition (state of origin principle)30 that forms the basis
of said freedoms’ interpretation works.31
28 Behme, “Reichweite und Grenzen der Überprüfbarkeit von nationalem Gesellschafts-
recht am Maßstab der Grundfreiheiten”, (2014) AG, 841–852, at 846 et seq.; Ringe,
“Company Law and Free Movement of Capital”, 69 Cambridge Law Journal (2010),
378–409, at 399 et seq.
29 See ECJ, case C-418/93, Semeraro [1996], ECR I-2975 para. 32; ECJ, case C-44/98,
BASF [1999], ECR I-6269 para. 21. Eidenmüller, in Eidenmüller (Ed.), Ausländische
Kapitalgesellschaften im deutschen Recht (München, 2004), § 3 para. 12 deduces a gene-
ral de minimis exception from these rulings.
30 Some draw a terminological distinction between the principle of mutual recognition and
the State of origin principle; according to these authors, the term “mutual recognition”
is of judicial origin, while the State of origin principle derives from secondary law. See
Lippert, “Die begrenzte Anerkennung – der EuGH sichert seine Kompetenz – Zugleich
ein Beitrag zur Diskussion um gegenseitige Anerkennung und Herkunftslandprinzip”,
(2007) EuR, 631–642, at 636. The professional literature generally uses both terms
synonymously; see Bitter, “Niederlassungsfreiheit für Kapitalgesellschaften in Europa:
Gläubigerschutz in Gefahr?” in Tietze/McGuire/Bendel (Ed.), Europäisches Priva-
trecht (Stuttgart, 2005), 299–333, at 324; Kahl, in: Calliess/Ruffert (Ed.), 4th ed. 2011,
Article 26 TFEU para. 25; Müller-Graff, in Streinz (Ed.), 2nd ed. 2012, Article 56 TFEU
para. 112 et seq.; Roth, “Europäische Kollisionsrechtsvereinheitlichung”, (2011) EWS,
314–328, at 324; see also Behrens, “Die Konvergenz der wirtschaftlichen Freiheiten im
europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht”, (1992) EuR, 145–162, according to whom the State
of origin principle includes the principle of mutual recognition, and Haltern, Euro-
parecht, 2nd ed. (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), para. 1625, who writes that the principle of
mutual recognition is an expression of the State of origin principle.
31 On the principle of mutual recognition, see seminally Behme, Rechtsformwahrende
Sitzverlegung und Formwechsel von Gesellschaften über die Grenze. Ein Beitrag zum
Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung im europäischen Gesellschaftsrecht (Mohr Sie-
beck, 2015), p. 65 et seqq.
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1. The Prohibition of Restriction as a Duty to Recognize: Cassis de Dijon
as a Specification of the Dassonville Formula
In the field of the free movement of goods, the principle of mutual recognition
takesintoaccountthatdifferentstandards32existthroughouttheMemberStates’
legal orders with which a product must comply in order to be brought into the
market. These standards can appositely be called “qualification standards”,33 as
the compliance with them decides whether the product is qualified as a market-
able good. These qualification standards do not pose a problem from the view-
pointofthe internalmarketas longastheyonlyapplytodomesticproducts; they
however hinder the cross-border marketing of a product once the Member
States apply their own qualification standards to foreign products, which they
are generally free to do as long as the fundamental freedoms do not provide
otherwise. If e.g. one Member State demands an insulator of three millimetres
of rubber for the insulation of electric cables and another a (possibly equally
effective) insulator of two millimetres of Bakelite, an internal market for electric
cables becomes impossible34 without one of the Member States having acted in
protectionist intent while setting the relevant qualification standard.
This problem can, as a matter of principle, be solved in two different ways: on
the one hand through the – politically not always enforceable – harmonization
of the respective qualification standards by the European legislator and on the
other hand through mutual recognition by the Member States. The ECJ has
paved the way for an obligation of mutual recognition founded in primary law
in the Cassis de Dijon decision, according to whose findings French spirits can
be marketed in Germany merely because they were lawfully (i.e. in conform-
ity with the relevant French qualification standards) produced and marketed
in France; the German legislator must accept their qualification as a market-
able good by its French counterpart.35 Not accepting this qualification, how-
ever, will constitute an infringement of the free movement of goods and thus of
European primary law.
32 See Haltern, Europarecht, 2nd ed. (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), para. 1388 with regard to this
term.
33 Behrens, “Die Konvergenz der wirtschaftlichen Freiheiten im europäischen Gemein-
schaftsrecht”, (1992) EuR, 145–162, at 146 uses the similarly accurate term of “quality
and qualification norms” (“Qualitäts- und Qualifikationsnormen”).
34 See Haltern, Europarecht, 2nd ed. (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), para. 1626 for this example.
35 Thus the ECJ, case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon [1979], ECR 649 para 14. “There is therefore
no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully produced and marketed in
one of the Member alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any other Mem-
ber State; the sale of such products may not be subject to a legal prohibition on the
marketing of beverages with an alcohol content lower than the limit set by the national
rules.”
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The principle of mutual recognition is based upon the assumption that the
qualification standards of the Member States are functionally equivalent.36 The
foundation of such an assumption of equivalence lies in the mutual confidence
that the Member States have in the quality of their national regulations.37 This
means that it suffices if a product complies with the qualification standards of
its State of origin in order to be qualified as a marketable good in the other
Member States. If this is the case, the non-recognition of a product by the host
State constitutes a restriction of the free movement of goods that will have to
be justified; in other words, a restriction necessitating a justification occurs
when a Member State acting as a host State fails to recognize and applies its
own qualification standards to a product that conforms to the qualification
standards of its State of origin. The principle of mutual recognition thus de-
limits the broad Dassonville formula according to which any trade regulation
constitutes a restriction capable of hindering intra-Community trade directly
or indirectly, actually or potentially.38 It already follows from this formula that
the application of any national provision of the host State on foreign products
can be a restriction of the free movement of goods solely because it has a
different (albeit not necessarily stricter) content than a comparable regulation
of the State of origin. Recognizing the qualification standard of the State of
origin prevents such a restriction induced by the mere difference between the
national qualification standards. In this respect, the observation that the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition can be traced not only to the Cassis de Dijon, but
already to the Dassonville judgment is accurate.39
36 Basedow, “Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Bin-
nenmarkt: favor offerentis”, 59 RabelsZ (1995), 1–55, at 4; Haltern, Europarecht, 2nd ed.
(Mohr Siebeck, 2007), para. 1626; Lippert, “Die begrenzte Anerkennung – der EuGH
sichert seine Kompetenz – Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Diskussion um gegenseitige Aner-
kennungundHerkunftslandprinzip”,(2007)EuR,631–642,at637;vonBorries/Petschke,
“Gleichwertigkeitsklauselnals InstrumentzurGewährleistungdes freienWarenverkehrs
in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft”, (1996) DVBl, 1343–1350, at 1349; see also Commis-
sion of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from
the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 28–29 June 1985) COM (85) 310 para.
65; see Götz, “Der Grundsatz der gegenseitigen Anerkennung im europäischen Binnen-
markt” in Götz/Selmer/Wolfrum (Ed.), Liber amicorum Günther Jaenicke – Zum 85.
Geburtstag (Berlin/Heidelberg/New York, 1998), 763–791, at 772 for a critical view.
37 Körber, Grundfreiheiten und Privatrecht, Jus Priv 93 (Tübingen, 2004), p. 134; Mansel,
“Anerkennung als Grundprinzip des Europäischen Rechtsraums – Zur Herausbildung
eines europäischen Anerkennungs-Kollisionsrechts: Anerkennung statt Verweisung als
neues Strukturprinzip des Europäischen internationalen Privatrechts?“, 70 RabelsZ
(2006), 651–731, at 668; Müller-Graff, “Gegenseitige Anerkennung im Europäischen
Unionsrecht – Rapport de Synthèse”, 111 ZVglRWiss (2012), 72–86, at 73.
38 ECJ, case 8/74, Dassonville [1974], ECR 837 para. 5.
39 Müller-Graff, “Gegenseitige Anerkennung im Europäischen Unionsrecht – Rapport de
Synthèse”, 111 ZVglRWiss (2012), 72–86, at 80, albeit without further substantiation.
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2. Qualification Standards as the Point of Reference
of the Recognition Obligation
The development of the principle of mutual recognition in the field of the free
movement of goods is paradigmatic for the appreciation of the other fundamen-
tal freedoms,40 the principle being inherent to all of them.41 Regardless of the
relevant fundamental freedom,thereferencepointofthehostState’s recognition
obligation can be found in the respective qualification standards of the State of
origin. As far as the free movement of goods is concerned, these qualification
standards refer to the qualification of a product as a marketable good; they are
primarily made up of technical requirements for the product’s properties. In the
field of the comparably structured42 freedom of services (Article 56 TFEU), of
establishment (Article 49 TFEU) and of movement for workers (Article 45
TFEU), the recognition of professional qualifications comes to the fore. All
three freedoms can be interpreted in a way that obliges the Member States to
take into serious consideration the professional qualifications earned in a differ-
ent Member State when granting professional licences.43
In the field of the freedom of establishment for companies, the host State’s
obligation of recognition refers to the qualification of a personal association as
a company. If a company complies with the qualification standards set by its
State of origin in order for a company to be established and to exist under its
national laws, the other Member States must recognize it as such, i.e. in the
respective legal form configured by the national law of its State of origin.44 In
40 See Müller-Graff, in von der Groeben/Schwarze (Ed.), 6th ed. 2003, preliminary remarks
to Articles 28 to 31 EC, para. 10 on the pioneering nature of the free movement of goods.
41 ECJ, case C-238/98, Hocsman [2000], ECR I-6623 para. 24; ECJ, case C-31/00, Drees-
sen [2002], ECR I-663 para. 25; see also Mansel, “Anerkennung als Grundprinzip des
Europäischen Rechtsraums – Zur Herausbildung eines europäischen Anerkennungs-
Kollisionsrechts: Anerkennung statt Verweisung als neues Strukturprinzip des Europä-
ischen internationalen Privatrechts?“, 70 RabelsZ (2006), 651–731, at 651; Ruffert,
“Recognition of Foreign Legislative and Administrative Acts” in Wolfrum (Ed.), The
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2008, online edition
([www.mpepil.com], last vistited 26 Jan. 2015), para. 12; S. Schmidt, “Mutual recogni-
tion as a new mode of governance”, (2007) Journal of European Public Policy, 667–681.
42 Hellwig, “Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Fragen des Code of Conduct des CCBE” in Grund-
mann/Haar/Merkt/Mülbert/Wellenhofer (Ed.), Festschrift für Klaus Hopt zum 70. Ge-
burtstag am 24. August 2010 (Berlin/New York, 2010), 2791–2824, at 2807.
43 ECJ, case C-340/89, Vlassopolou [1991], ECR I-2357 para. 16; ECJ, case C-104/91,
Aguirre Borell [1992], ECR-3003 para. 11; ECJ, case C-375/92, Commission v. Spain
[1994], ECR I-923 para. 12; ECJ, case C-238/98, Hocsman [2000], ECR I-6623 para. 21;
ECJ, case C-31/00, Dreessen [2002], ECR I-663 para. 24.
44 In the field of corporate law, the recognition always has a dimension related to the
conflict of laws: as the national law of the host State does not know the legal form of
the immigrated company as originally determined by the law of the company’s State of
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terms of corporate law, qualification standards thus consist of the require-
ments for the establishment and continued existence of a company in a par-
ticular legal form of its State of origin.45 These corporate qualification stand-
ards comprise all relevant characteristics that define a legal form, that regulate
its “incorporation and functioning”46 and give distinction to its “corporate
identity”47. This notably includes provisions that define the necessary terri-
torial link of a company to its State of origin and thus determine whether the
statutory seat, the center of administration (real seat) or both seats of a com-
pany must lie in the State of origin or can be moved to a different Member State
at will. But the requirements pertaining to the formation and preservation of
capital, the organizational statutes and the rules on the liability of shareholders
and executives also belong to the corporate qualification standards. If for
instance a company must form a certain minimum capital according to the
law of its State of origin, the host State may not subsequently amplify this
requirement or apply its own minimum capital requirements on the foreign
company in the desire to enforce its own conception of how a company’s
creditors should be adequately protected.48 It is likewise precluded from ap-
plying its own rules on employee codetermination on a company which must
not or only to a certain extent guarantee such codetermination pursuant to the
laws of its State of origin; to the contrary, it must accept the State of origin’s
decision for or against employee codetermination or a particular level of such
codetermination.49 Applying own corporate qualification standards to foreign
origin, recognition can only occur by referring to the State of origin’s substantive
corporate law in the host State’s provisions on the conflict of laws. Whether the freedom
of establishment includes a “hidden” provision concerning the conflict of laws by way
of a so-called theory of incorporation is a different question whose answer does not
follow from the above and which shall not be dealt with here. See Basedow, “Der
kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäischen Binnenmarkt: favor
offerentis”, 59 RabelsZ (1995), 1–55, at 12; Körber, Grundfreiheiten und Privatrecht, Jus
Priv 93 (Tübingen, 2004), p. 432; Wendehorst, “Kollisionsnormen im primären Euro-
parecht?” in Lorenz/Trunk/Eidenmüller/Wendehorst/Adolff (Ed.), Festschrift für An-
dreas Heldrich zum 70. Geburtstag (München, 2005), 1071–1088, at 1085 for the appo-
site distinction between these questions.
45 Behme, Rechtsformwahrende Sitzverlegung und Formwechsel von Gesellschaften über
die Grenze. Ein Beitrag zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung im europäischen
Gesellschaftsrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 2015), p. 89 et seqq.
46 ECJ, case C-378/10, Vale [2012], ECLI:EU:C:2012:440 para. 30.
47 See Armour/Ringe, “European Company Law 1999—2010: Renaissance and Crisis”, 48
CML Rev. (2011), 125–174, at 138 and passim; Eidenmüller, “Die Reichweite des
Gesellschaftsstatuts” in Sonnenberger (Ed.), Vorschläge und Berichte zur Reform des
europäischen und deutschen internationalen Gesellschaftsrechts (Tübingen, 2007),
469–496, at 473.
48 ECJ, case C-167/01, Inspire Art [2003], ECR I-10155 para. 100 et seq.
49 Behme, “Die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer bei der britischen Limited mit Verwal-
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companies constitutes a restriction of the right to free establishment which
will but rarely fulfil Union law justification grounds: the ECJ employs very
strict standards in its proportionality test.
Since what matters to Union law is only the result of national corporate law’s
application in cross-border contexts and not its general theory, it is irrelevant
to the application of a corporate qualification standard of the host State to
foreign companies how the host State’s rules on the conflict of laws evaluate
this qualification standard. What determines that a certain provision restricts
the right to free establishment is only that this provision is a corporate quali-
fication standard whose application contradicts the recognition of foreign
legal forms. This is undoubtedly the case of the shareholders’ liability for
destruction of the corporation’s economic basis (Existenzvernichtungshaf-
tung) under German law; its application to foreign corporations thus violates
the obligation to recognize foreign liability regimes regarding the respective
legal forms and restricts the freedom of establishment. The Federal Court’s
recent ruling50 according to which this liability traces its theoretical founda-
tion to sect. 826 of the German Civil Code (BGB) and thus possibly forms part
of tort, not of corporate law,51 is irrelevant in this context.52 The same applies
to the question whether the German rules on the subordination and voidabili-
tungssitz in Deutschland”, (2008) ZIP, 351–357, at 356; Eidenmüller, “Wettbewerb der
Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa”, (2002) ZIP, 2233–2245, at 2242; Paefgen, “Auslandsge-
sellschaften und Durchsetzung deutscher Schutzinteressen nach ‘Überseering’, (2003)
DB, 487–492, at 492; Schanze/Jüttner, “Die Entscheidung für Pluralität: Kollisionsrecht
und Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-Entscheidung ‘Inspire Art’“, (2003) AG, 661–
671, at 668 arrive at the same conclusion; see Weiss/Seifert, “Der europarechtliche Rah-
men für ein ‘Mitbestimmungserstreckungsgesetz’“, (2009) ZGR, 542–580, at 567 for the
opposite opinion.
50 BGH ZIP 2007, 1557 (“Trihotel”).
51 See Gloger/Goette/van Huet, “Die neue Rechtsprechung zur Existenzvernichtungshaf-
tung mit Ausblick in das englische Recht (Teil II)“, (2008) DStR, 1194–1197, at 1195 et
seq.; Weller, “Die Neuausrichtung der Existenzvernichtungshaftung durch den BGH
und ihre Implikationen für die Praxis”, (2007) ZIP, 1681–1689. Eidenmüller, “Private
Equity, Leverage und die Effizienz des Gläubigerschutzrechts”, 171 ZHR (2007),
644–683, at 661 and Gehrlein, “Die Existenzvernichtungshaftung im Wandel der Recht-
sprechung”, (2008) WM, 761–769, at 769 continue to favour a corporate law quali-
fication despite the Trihotel ruling.
52 An opinion shared by Bitter, “Niederlassungsfreiheit für Kapitalgesellschaften in Euro-
pa: Gläubigerschutz in Gefahr?” in Tietze/McGuire/Bendel (Ed.), Europäisches Privat-
recht (Stuttgart, 2005), 299–333, at 310; Grundmann, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht,
2nd ed. (C.F. Müller, 2011), para. 785; K. Schmidt, “Verlust der Mitte durch ‘Inspire
Art’? – Verwerfungen im Unternehmensrecht durch Schreckreaktionen der Literatur”,
168 ZHR (2004), 493–502, at 499; and Teichmann, Binnenmarktkonformes Gesell-
schaftsrecht (De Gruyter, 2006), p. 465.
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ty of shareholder loans (sect. 39 para. 1 no. 5 and sect. 135 of the German
Insolvency Code [InsO]) regulate foreign companies with an administrative
seat in Germany: it is irrelevant whether the German rules on the conflict of
laws regard these provisions as belonging to bankruptcy or rather to corporate
law. What matters from a European law point of view is that the provisions
constitute corporate qualification standards, which means that their applica-
tion to foreign companies limits these companies’ freedom of establishment
regardless of the provisions’ nature as bankruptcy law regulations. Character-
izing a certain national provision as pertaining to corporate law according to
the rules on the conflict of laws and labeling the same regulation a corporate
law qualification standard may thus present a considerable overlap; but the
criteria are not synonymous.
3. The Treatment of Framework Conditions as a Limitation of the
Recognition Obligation
Some voices in academia believe that the ECJ’s Keck ruling softened the obliga-
tion of mutual recognition.53 In this decision, the ECJ limited the broad prohi-
bition of restriction set out in the Dassonville ruling by excluding national
provisions that restrict or prohibit certain selling arrangements from the ambit
of the free movement of goods.54 This does not however mean that the principle
of mutual recognition was watered down. Keck did not limit the principle ac-
cordingtowhichthehostState mustgenerally accept thequalificationstandards
of the State of origin as functionally equivalent, but rather clarified that the
obligation of recognition is confined to these qualification standards and does
not go beyond them.55 That is the reason why selling arrangements must not be
evaluated against the standard of the right to free establishment; for these ar-
rangements precisely do not constitute product-related qualification standards,
but mere marketing-related location or framework conditions that are not even
susceptible of recognition by the host State.56 For instance, a prohibition of
53 See S. Schmidt, “Gefangen im “lock in”? Zur Pfadabhängigkeit der Rechtsprechung des
Europäischen Gerichtshofs”, (2010) Der moderne Staat, 455–473, at 458 (Keck as a
“break with the past” [”Pfadbruch”]); see also Büchele, “Diskriminierung, Beschrän-
kung und Keck-Mithouard – die Warenverkehrsfreiheit” in Roth/Hilpold (Ed.), Der
EuGH und die Souveränität der Mitgliedstaaten (Stuttgart, 2008), 335–394, at 356: “the
great trend reversal”.
54 ECJ, case C-268/91, Keck [1993], ECR I-6097 para. 16 et seq.
55 Behme, Rechtsformwahrende Sitzverlegung und Formwechsel von Gesellschaften über
die Grenze. Ein Beitrag zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung im europäischen
Gesellschaftsrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 2015), p. 72 et seq.
56 Michaels, Anerkennungspflichten im Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht der Europäischen Ge-
meinschaft und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Duncker & Humblot, 2004), p. 230.
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selling on a Sunday in the host State57 has nothing to do with the principle of
recognizing foreign products. “Recognizing” the possibility in the State of ori-
gin of selling the product on a Sunday would entail the host State’s permission of
Sunday sales – at least regarding foreign products – and therefore, in the end, a
complete abolition of its own prohibition. This means that Keck does not in-
clude an exception to, but merely an important terminological specification of
the principle of mutual recognition.58
This does not only make sense from a theoretical standpoint, but is also
justified on teleological grounds: simple selling arrangements do not infringe,
as the ECJ has correctly emphasized,59 the market access of foreign products;
they are unobjectionable from a internal market point of view.60
A precondition for the exclusion of selling arrangements from the ambit of the
free movement of goods and the recognition obligation is however that these
arrangements apply to all concerned business participants who pursue their
activities in the host State and that they affect the marketing of domestic
products in the same way both legally and actually. The free movement of
goods thus does not become irrelevant for selling arrangements but rather
limits itself to a prohibition of discrimination.
The term “selling arrangements” is tailored to the free movement of goods and
not apposite for the other fundamental freedoms; however, the objective of the
Keck ruling can be translated to the freedom of services, of establishment and
of movement for workers: only those qualification standards of the State of
origin must be recognized that regulate the access to a particular profession.
The fundamental freedoms therefore enable an integration of service providers
and workers who acquired their professional qualification in a different Mem-
ber State into the labour market of the host State. If however the national law
of the host State defines certain modalities for the provision of services and
work – for instance, maximum working time regulations or bans on advertis-
57 In its Torfaen ruling (case 145/88 [1989], ECR 3851), the ECJ had still considered a
British Sunday sale prohibition a restrictive measure, while Advocate-General van
Gerven already proposed limiting the scope of application of the free movement of
goods (opinion of June 29, 1989, para. 23).
58 Michaels, Anerkennungspflichten im Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Duncker & Humblot, 2004),
p. 230 already argued similarly (“a confirmation of the term mutual recognition from
the ECJ’s Cassis de Dijon ruling”).
59 ECJ, case C-268/91, Keck [1993], ECR I-6097 para. 17.
60 Regarding market access as the deciding criterion, see Büchele, in Roth/Hilpold (ed.),
Der EuGH und die Souveränität der Mitgliedstaaten, 2008, S. 335 (380 ff.); Nohlen,
Binnenmarktkonformer Minderheitenschutz bei der grenzüberschreitenden Verschmel-
zung von Aktiengesellschaften (Nomos, 2012), p. 131.
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ing61 –, these modalities must not be evaluated against the standard of the
fundamental freedoms. “Framework conditions” is a term tailored to all fun-
damental freedoms which adequately describes this category of regulations
that do not pertain to the field of qualification standards which in turn create
an obligation of recognition.62
Regarding the freedom of establishment for companies, obligations that per-
tain e.g. to disclosures or certifications should be considered framework con-
ditions of establishment; the same holds true for mandatory participation in an
industry or commerce chamber for foreign corporations with a domestic
centre of administration.63 These obligations are not susceptible of mutual
recognition, as they are not linked to a foreign legal form; they are not objec-
tionable from an internal market point of view because they do not infringe the
market access of foreign companies. Again, it is not up to national rules on the
conflict of laws to decide whether or not a provision is a framework condition;
rules pertaining to a Member State’s international corporate law can thus
constitute framework conditions and be applied to foreign companies without
restricting these companies’ freedom of establishment. However, the standard
set to evaluate whether a provision is a mere framework condition is strict; the
ECJ’s Daily Mail and Cartesio rulings equate “modalities” of seat transfer to
qualification standards whose non-recognition constitutes a restriction of the
61 This only means that a ban on advertising in the host State (e.g. for members of free
professions [Freiberufler]) does not infringe the freedom of services or of establishment;
see Hellwig, “Perspektiven der deutschen Anwaltschaft ex Europa”, (2005) NJW,
1217–1226, at 1219 for a differing opinion. The ban does however violate Article 24 para.
1 of the services directive 2006/123/EC of December 12, 2006 pursuant to which the
Member States shall remove all total prohibitions on commercial communications by
theregulatedprofessions; seeHellwig,“AnmerkungzuEuGH:WerbungfürFreiberufler
ist frei”, (2011) AnwBl., 493–494, at 494 for an accurate analysis of the advertising ban for
lawyers. The directive thus goes beyond the fundamental freedoms guarantee.
62 See Poiares Maduro, We The Court – The European Court of Justice an the European
Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing, 1998), p. 83 for a similar term; the author
distinguishes between “characteristics” and “circumstances” with regard to the free
movement of goods; see also Müller-Graff, in von der Groeben/Schwarze (Ed.), 6th
ed. 2003, preliminary remarks to Articles 28 EC, para. 254, who labels the provisions
called framework conditions above “marketing impediments” that follow from general
provisions of order without regard to cross-border trade or specific products.
63 That is why the Administrative Court of Darmstadt’s ruling (VG Darmstadt, MittBay-
Not 2007, 149) and Kluth’s (“IHK-Pflichtmitgliedschaft weiterhin mit dem Grundge-
setz vereinbar”, [2002] NVwZ, 298–301, at 301) opinion are accurate; however, the ECJ
took a different course with regard to the freedom of services: ECJ, case C-58/98,
Corsten [2000], ECR I-7919 para. 34; case C-215/01, Schnitzer [2003], ECR I-14847
para. 34 et seq.
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freedom of establishment.64 Regulations tied to the actual process of establish-
ment can thus not be considered framework conditions.
4. The Autonomy of the State of Origin in Defining the
Qualification Standards
The above elaborations pertain to the fundamental freedoms’ demands on the
regulation of cross-border activities by the Member States in their role as host
State. The freedoms however not only address the Member States in that ca-
pacity, but also lay down obligations for them as countries of origin. For in-
stance, the free movement of goods not only precludes quantitative restrictions
on imports and all measures having equivalent effect (Article 34 TFEU), but also
quantitative export restrictions and all measures having equivalent effect in the
State of origin (Article 35 TFEU); from the perspective of market participants, it
thus not only pertains to imports, but also to exports. The other fundamental
freedoms do not comprise separate provisions for restrictions in the host State
and the State of origin; but within their ambit, their formulation includes both
MemberStatesconcernedbyacross-bordermovement(cf.Articles45para.1,59
para. 1, 56 para. 1, 63 para. 1 TFEU). From the viewpoint of market participants,
the freedomstherefore protectbothmovingabroadvis-à-vis theirStateoforigin
as well as establishing themselves abroad vis-à-vis the host State. This seems
appropriate in light of the internal market, as appreciating an activity as an
import or export or as moving in or away is merely a question of perspective.
Both are reciprocally conditional distinctions of a uniform process, namely the
cross-border movement of goods or the pursuit of cross-border mobility.65
The question, however, to which extent national law must stand the test of the
fundamental freedoms on the one hand and how much political leeway remains
ontheotherhandnotonlyarises for thehostState,butalsofor theStateoforigin.
The answer to this question lies in clarifying that the principle of mutual recog-
nition essential for interpreting the fundamental freedoms has a twofold func-
tion: it not only assures the marketability of goods and the mobility of natural
persons and companies in the internal market,66 but goes beyond that to solve a
conflict of competence that impedes said marketability of goods and mobility of
natural persons and corporations. This conflict of competence results from two
MemberStatespotentiallyclaimingtodefinetherelevantqualificationstandards
64 ECJ, case 81/87, Daily Mail [1988], ECR 5483 para. 23; ECJ, case C-210/06, Cartesio
[2008], ECR I-9641 para. 107.
65 See Kämmerer, “Inländer im Europarecht – Obsoleszenz oder Renaissance eines
Rechtsbegriffs?“, (2008) EuR, 45–56, at 48.
66 Jayme/Kohler, “Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2001: Anerkennungsprinzip statt IPR?“,
(2001) IPRax, 501–514, at 501.
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foraproduct,aprofessionortheconfigurationofacorporationinacross-border
situation: the State of origin does so because a certain product is produced on its
territory and marketed there for the first time, because a natural person acquires
its professional qualification on its territory, because a corporation was initially
established under its national law; the host State does so because a product is
marketed on its territory after crossing the border, because a natural person
pursues his or her professional activities there, because a corporation commen-
ces business there. The principle of mutual recognition resolves this conflict by
exclusivelyassigningthejurisdictionfordefiningandenforcingthequalification
standards to the State of origin.67 In cross-border situations, it causes the host
State’s general authority to define the qualification standards required on its
territory to step back behind the equivalent but preceding authority of the State
of origin; the definition and enforcement of the qualification standards by the
Stateoforigincontinuestotakeeffect inthehostState.Thishorizontalallocation
of competence to the State of origin means that this Member State can autono-
mously define the qualification standards without them falling under the ambit
of the fundamental freedoms. The definitional autonomy of the State of origin is
inherent to the principle of mutual recognition. Recognition can only be mutual
between the Member States if each Member State can claim autonomy within its
ownjurisdiction; no Member State wouldbe willing torecognize otherMember
States’ qualification standards if it couldn’t be sure of the other States’ recogni-
tion of its own qualification standards. The autonomy of the Member States to
define qualification standards in their capacity as State of origin is thus the un-
written premise of the recognition of other Member States’ qualification stand-
ards; there exists an intrinsic reciprocity between the recognition obligation of
the host State and the definitional autonomy of the State of origin.
Regarding the freedom of establishment for companies, the ECJ already came
to delineate the State of origin’s autonomy in defining qualification standards
in its corporate law in the Daily Mail ruling of 1988; according to this judg-
ment and the state of contemporary (and since unchanged) Union law, corpo-
rations are creatures of national law which are established under a national
legal order and do not have a reality beyond the respective legal order that
determines their incorporation and functioning.68 In the Cartesio and Nation-
67 Behme, Rechtsformwahrende Sitzverlegung und Formwechsel von Gesellschaften über
die Grenze. Ein Beitrag zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung im europäischen
Gesellschaftsrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 2015), p. 65 et seq.; see furthermore Roth, “Der
Einfluß des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts auf das Internationale Privatrecht”, 55
RabelsZ (1991), 623–673, at 666 for an early proponent of this argument. However, the
author is not quite precise as he talks of a competence shift, although the State of origin’s
jurisdiction for the definition and enforcement of qualification standards is original, not
derivative, and merely continues to exist in the case of a cross-border movement.
68 ECJ, case 81/87, Daily Mail [1988], ECR 5483 para. 19.
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al Grid Indus rulings,69 the court has, against numerous predictions voiced in
legal literature, confirmed this insight that German academia – always focused
on formulating “theories” – strikingly calls the “theory of creation” (Ge-
schöpftheorie)70. In its capacity as State of origin, each Member State thus
enjoys the autonomy to define the qualification standards that a corporation
must fulfil in order to be established and continue to exist under its national
law. If a corporation fails to meet the conditions set by the State of origin for
the establishment of corporations in a specific legal form, the State of origin
may already refuse the creation according to its national law; if one of the
conditions cease to be fulfilled, it can withdraw the previously accorded legal
form from the corporation, e.g. by mandating the company’s dissolution. As
the requirements pertaining to the location of the corporation’s seat also be-
long to the qualification standards of corporate law, the State of origin can
refuse the creation of a corporation whose seat has always been abroad and can
sanction subsequently moving the seat abroad with the withdrawal of the
corporation’s legal form. The State of origin’s autonomy that emanates from
the principle of mutual recognition thus explains why relocating a company’s
seat while maintaining the previous legal form is not protected by the freedom
of establishment when the company relocates abroad – and hence encounters
legal obstacles set up by the country of origin – while taking up residence
domestically – and hence encountering legal obstacles set up by the host State –
is protected by said freedom. Voices in academia that have often criticized the
different treatment of relocating abroad (“outbound cases”) and taking up
residence domestically (“inbound cases”)71 are thus unfounded.
69 ECJ, case C-210/06, Cartesio [2008], ECR I-9641 para. 104; ECJ, case C-371/10 [2011],
ECR I-12273 para. 26.
70 See Bayer/Schmidt, “Das Vale-Urteil des EuGH: Die endgültige Bestätigung der Nie-
derlassungsfreiheit als ‘Formwechselfreiheit’, (2012) ZIP, 1481–1492, at 1481; Kindler,
“Ende der Diskussion über die so genannte Wegzugsfreiheit”, (2009) NZG, 130–132, at
131; Rehm in: Eidenmüller (Ed.), Ausländische Kapitalgesellschaften im deutschen
Recht, 2004, § 2 para. 61 et seq.
71 See e.g. Armour/Ringe, “European Company Law 1999–2010: Renaissance and Crisis”,
CML Rev. 48 (2011), 125 (139 et seq.); Borg-Barthet, “European Private International
Law of Companies after Cartesio”, ICLQ 58 (2009), 1020 (1025 et seq.); Mörsdorf,
“Beschränkung der Mobilität von EU-Gesellschaften im Binnenmarkt – eine Zwischen-
bilanz”, EuZW 2009, 97 (98 et seq.); Zimmer/Naendrup, “Das Cartesio-Urteil des
EuGH: Rück- oder Fortschritt für das internationale Gesellschaftsrecht?”, NJW
2009, 545 (546).
ECFR 1/2016 The Principle of Mutual Recognition 47
Bereitgestellt von | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Universitätsbibliothek (LMU)
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 06.12.18 16:02
5. The Treatment of Framework Conditions as a Restriction
of the Definitional Autonomy
The State of origin has the authority to autonomously define the qualification
standards that a good must fulfil in order to be marketable. It cannot, however,
prohibit the export of a good that meets these standards: Article 35 TFEU ex-
pressly forbids quantitative restrictions on exports and measures having equiv-
alent effect. Speaking in the words of the Keck ruling, the autonomy the State of
origin enjoys is limited to establishing product-related regulations; selling ar-
rangements (“selling modalities”) must fulfil the standard of the free movement
of goods, provided that they have a cross-border impact. Likewise, the State of
origin cannot, with regard to a natural person’s cross-border pursuit of a pro-
fession, prohibit the exercise abroad of qualifications acquired domestically or
set conditions for activities abroad that render these activities less attractive.
Bothcaseswouldconstitutearestrictionoftherespectivefundamentalfreedom–
either the freedom of services, of establishment or of movement for workers.
With respect to the cross-border mobility of companies, the ECJ also recently
ruled that provisions of the State of origin that merely lay down framework
conditions for the status-maintaining relocation of the company’s centre of
administration into a different Member State and do not withdraw the corpo-
ration’s legal form as a result of the relocation, thus not revisiting the corpora-
tion’s statusassuch,mustbeevaluatedagainst thefreedomofestablishment.The
National Grid Indus case dealt with the question whether a provision of the
Dutch tax law was compatible with the right to free establishment. This provi-
sionstipulatedthatallhiddenreservesofacorporationthat relocates itscentreof
administration into another Member State be immediately subjected to taxation
in the Netherlands. Yet the relocation of the seat had no effect on the corpora-
tion’s status as a corporation under Dutch law. The court thus consequently held
that a cross-border seat relocation has no effect under Dutch law on the corpo-
ration’s possibility to claim the freedom of establishment. It then concluded in
relatively short words that there had been a restriction and refused to affirm
mandatory requirements of public interest as grounds of justification.72
This argumentation evidences that the ECJ would assess the Daily Mail case
differently today. For just as in the National Grid Indus case, what impeded a
relocation of the Daily Mail’s management to the Netherlands was not a
corporate qualification standard, but rather a provision of British tax law
pursuant to which a relocation of the centre of administration necessitated a
permit by the British treasury; paying taxes on the hidden reserves could fulfil
72 ECJ, case C-371/10, National Grid Indus [2011], ECR I-12273 para. 26; for an identical
argumentation see ECJ, case C-38/10, Commission v. Portugal [2012], ZIP 2012, 1801
with comments by Behme, (2012) EWiR, 681–682.
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the permit’s conditions. Like the contentious provision in the National Grid
Indus case, requiring a permit is to be seen as a framework condition of
establishment that would be considered a restriction of the freedom of estab-
lishment under the freedom’s current theoretical understanding73 and would
hardly fulfil Union law grounds of justification.
6. Deduction: the Fundamental Freedoms as Provisions of Competence Allo-
cation for the Definition of Qualification Standards and Framework Conditions
The State of origin’s autonomy is thus inverse to the host State’s obligation of
recognition (“opposite Keck case”): while the application of the host State’s
product-related qualification standards on goods, services or corporations con-
stitutes a restriction, its framework conditions that apply to domestic and for-
eign market participants alike are not subject to evaluation against the prohi-
bition of restriction; the host State thus enjoys a definitional autonomy solely
delimited by the prohibition of discrimination. Just as competences are hori-
zontally assigned to the State of origin regarding product-related qualification
standards, the host State can be regarded as the beneficiary of a horizontal com-
petence allocation in the field of framework conditions.
The fundamental freedoms can therefore be interpreted as provisions alloca-
ting competences: in cross-border situations, they assign the State of origin the
competence to define and enforce qualification standards (thus instituting the
State of origin principle) and the host State the competence to define and
enforce framework conditions (thus instituting the State of destination prin-
ciple). If the Member States apply regulations of their own national law to
cases in which the fundamental freedoms allocate the competence to another
State, this application constitutes a restriction of the relevant fundamental
freedom that necessitates a justification founded in Union law. If however
the Member States act within the jurisdiction described above, they must only
heed the principle of national treatment (prohibition of discrimination), as set
out clearly in the ECJ’s Keck ruling.
73 Grundmann, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, 2nd ed. (C.F. Müller, 2011), para. 799;
Hellwig, “Von Daily Mail zu Cartesio” in von Westphalen (Ed.), Deutsches Recht im
Wettbewerb (Wiesbaden, 2009), 154–159, at 157; and Wilhelmi, “Anwendung der Nie-
derlassungsfreiheit auf Gesellschaften bei Sitzverlegung”, (2009) JZ, 411–413, at 412
share this opinion; see Barthel, “Die Niederlassungsfreiheit der Gesellschaften nach
EuGH “Cartesio” – die Suche nach dem Gleichgewicht zwischen Wettbewerb im Bin-
nenmarkt und nationalstaatlicher Regelungsautonomie”, (2010) EWS, 316–330, at 328
et seq. and Bratton/McCahery/Vermeulen, “How Does Corporate Mobility Affect
Lawmaking? A Comparative Analysis”, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. (2009), 347–385, at 350
for a differing opinion.
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IV. On the Relationship Between the Recognition Obligation of
Primary Law and European Secondary Law
This contribution’s penultimate part will touch upon the relationship between
the Member States’ primary law obligation to mutually recognize qualifica-
tion standards and adjoining measures of secondary law. Secondary law can
have two different functions regarding the establishment and enforcement of
qualification standards: on the one hand, it can harmonize these standards and
abolish the necessity of mutual recognition by the Member States to the extent
of the harmonization; but on the other hand, it can also abstain from a har-
monization and limit itself to delineating the obligation of mutual recognition
already founded in primary law.
Harmonization can either lead to a complete assimilation of Member States’
qualification standards (full harmonization) or can create a core of common
rules within which the national legislators retain a certain leeway (minimum
harmonization). In the latter case, the standards set in exercise of this leeway
bring about the other Member States’ obligation to recognize them. It follows
therefrom that mutual recognition and harmonization of qualification stand-
ards are not exclusive, but rather parallel elements of a strategy to achieve the
internal market.74 From the internal market’s perspective, a harmonization of
qualification standards becomes necessary when the host State can justify its
non-recognition of qualification standards with mandatory requirements of
public interest. Such justification of a fundamental freedom’s restriction leaves
the restriction-induced market fragmentation intact, thus triggering a harmo-
nization competence under Articles 114 and 115 TFEU75.76 Yet not only quali-
fication standards, but also framework conditions are susceptible of harmo-
nization if they distort competition and thus compromise the functioning of
the internal market. That these framework conditions are exempt from eva-
luation against the fundamental freedoms as a result of the principle of recog-
nition’s modus operandi as terminologically specified in Keck does not change
the fact that they can impede competition and can thus be harmonized pur-
74 See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market:
White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 28–29 June
1985) COM (85) 310 para. 61 et seq. for an early example of this perspective.
75 See Tietje, in Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, Article 115 TFEU para. 7 et seq. (March 2011)
regarding the convergence of both provisions’ interpretation.
76 See Haltern, Europarecht, 2nd ed. (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), para. 1591 et seq.; and Weiler,
“Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade” in idem. (Ed.), The EU, the
WTO, and the NAFTA (Oxford/New York, 2000), 201–232, at 227 for an elaborate
analysis; see also Jayme/Kohler, “Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2001: Anerkennungs-
prinzip statt IPR?“, (2001) IPRax, 501–514, at 501 (“indication for further need of
harmonization”).
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suant to Articles 114 and 115 TFEU.77 Weiler’s and Haltern’s opinion that the
ECJ limited the scope of application not only of the fundamental freedoms but
also of Articles 114 and 115 TFEU in Keck78 is thus not convincing.79
Delimiting primary law’s recognition obligation through secondary law can
make sense in order to promote legal security. That is why the European
legislator already created a secondary law framework for the recognition of
college diplomas awarded on completion of a minimum three-year studying
period in its 1988 directive on the recognition of higher-education diplomas80.
Specific directives for particular groups of professions ensued. The majority of
these directives was abolished when the 2005 directive on the recognition of
professional qualifications81 which, similar to the services directive82, follows a
cross-sectoral approach83, entered into force.84 The content of the directive on
77 Tietje, in Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, Article 114 TFEU para. 98 (March 2011); see also
Leible/Schröder, in Streinz (Ed.), 2nd ed. 2012, Article 114 TFEU para. 44; Koenig/
Kühling, “Der Streit um die neue Tabakproduktrichtlinie – Ist der Gemeinschaftsge-
setzgeber bei seinem Kampf gegen den Tabakkonsum einmal mehr im Konflikt mit
Gemeinschaftsgrundrechten und Kompetenzbestimmungen?“, (2002) EWS, 12–20, at
17.
78 Haltern, Europarecht, 2nd ed. (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), para. 1683; Weiler, “Epilogue:
Towards a Common Law of International Trade” in Weiler (Ed.), The EU, the WTO,
and the NAFTA (Oxford/New York, 2000), 201–232, at 227.
79 See Behme, Rechtsformwahrende Sitzverlegung und Formwechsel von Gesellschaften
über die Grenze. Ein Beitrag zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung im europä-
ischen Gesellschaftsrecht (Mohr Siebeck, 2015), p. 270 et seqq.
80 Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recog-
nition of higher-education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education
and training of at least three years’ duration.
81 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September
2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications.
82 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2006 on services in the internal market.
83 Kluth/Rieger, “Die neue EU-Berufsanerkennungsrichtlinie – Regelungsgehalt und
Auswirkungen für Berufsangehörige und Berufsorganisationen”, (2005) EuZW,
486–492, at 486 et seq. Some specific directives for certain professions remain; for
instance, the lawyer-specific services directive (Council Directive 77/249/EEC of 22
March 1977 to facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to provide services)
and the lawyer-specific establishment directive (Directive 98/5/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession
of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the quali-
fication was obtained) apply to that profession. See Hellwig, “Gemeinschaftsrechtliche
Fragen des Code of Conduct des CCBE” in Grundmann/Haar/Merkt/Mülbert/Well-
enhofer (Ed.), Festschrift für Klaus Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010 (Ber-
lin/New York, 2010), 2791–2824, at 2815 et seq. on the relationship between the lawyer-
specific and the general services directive.
84 See the enumeration in number 9 of the directive’s recitals.
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the recognition of professional qualifications proves to be a reflection of the
fundamental freedoms’ theoretical understanding because it distinguishes be-
tween the pursuit of an activity in the host State (i.e. the market access) on the
one hand and the modalities of the profession’s pursuit (i.e. the framework
conditions) on the other; it does this without however watering down the
fundamental freedoms’ importance in the field of recognition of natural per-
sons’ professional qualifications. That means that also when the directives on
the mutual recognition of diplomas do not apply in the specific case, the
obligation to mutual consideration or recognition of professional qualifica-
tions deduced from the fundamental freedoms applies nevertheless on the level
of primary law;85 for as the ECJ held in the Dreessen case with regard to the
free establishment of natural persons, these directives solely have the function
of facilitating the mutual recognition by setting common rules and criteria.
They do and may not however aim to hinder mutual recognition in situations
to which they do not apply.86
As regards the freedom of establishment for companies, the ECJ ruled in
almost identical fashion that the obligation to recognize foreign corporations
flows immediately from the right to free establishment and is not subject to a
convention among the Member States on the mutual recognition of corpora-
tions according to Article 293 of the old TEC.87 Nevertheless, European legal
measures that harmonize Member States’ standards pertaining to a company’s
seat or – at least – Member States’ rules on the conflict of laws remain highly
desirable. The same applies to the further harmonization of the legal frame-
work for transnational transformations;88 for the mere assertion that these
85 ECJ, case C-238/98, Hocsman [2000], ECR I-6623 para. 31 et seq.; ECJ, case C-31/00,
Dreessen [2002] ECR I-663 para. 25 et seq. The court had already ruled likewise for
cases in which relevant directives did not yet exist: see case 71/76, Thieffry [1977], ECR
765 para. 17.
86 ECJ, case C-31/00, Dreessen [2002] ECR I-663 para. 26.
87 ECJ, case C-208/00, Überseering [2002], ECR I-9919, para. 55 and 60. Of the five judges
who had taken part in the Dreessen ruling, four also participated in the Überseering
decision, namely the judges Edward, La Pergola, Jann and von Bahr. See also ECJ, case
C-411/03, SEVIC [2005], ECR I-10805, para. 67 and Müller-Graff, in Streinz (Ed.), 2nd
ed. 2012, Article 54 TFEU para. 14.
88 Regarding the project of a directive on the transfer of a company’s statutory seat, see
Bayer/Schmidt, “Grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung und grenzüberschreitende Re-
strukturierungen nach MoMiG, Cartesio und Trabrennbahn”, 173 ZHR (2009), 735-
774, at 770; Behme, “Der grenzüberschreitende Formwechsel von Gesellschaften nach
Cartesio und Vale”, (2012) NZG, 936-939, at 939; Borg-Barthet, “European Private
International Law of Companies after Cartesio”, 58 ICLQ (2009), 1020-1028, at
1028; Kieninger, “The Law Applicable to Corporations in the EC”, 73 RabelsZ
(2009), 607-628; Schön, “Das System der gesellschaftsrechtlichen Niederlassungsfrei-
heit nach VALE”, (2013) ZGR, 333-365, at 364 et seq.; Wisniewski/Opalski, “Compa-
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transformations are protected by the freedom of establishment does little to
help legal practice, as the latter depends upon a binding legal framework. The
use of analogies with existing provisions (e.g. the transnational merger of
corporations or seat relocations for SE)89 increases the cost of transactions
and proves to be an obstacle for the transnational restructuring of companies.
V. Conclusion and Outlook
The often misinterpreted rulings of the ECJ on the freedom of establishment
for companies conform to the general theory of the fundamental freedoms and
embody these freedoms’ interpretation as setting a principle of mutual recog-
nition. The ECJ developed this principle primarily for the free movement of
goods in the Dassonville, Cassis de Dijon and Keck decisions; the principle
however also applies to the other fundamental freedoms. In the last years, it
has been increasingly discussed in the light of the right to free establishment
and free services: while not one of the 25 most commented upon ECJ rulings as
of January 1, 2000 pertains to the free movement of goods, ten relate to the
freedom of establishment or of services.90 Apparently, these freedoms have
replaced the free movement of goods as paradigmatic freedoms.
The principle of mutual recognition leads to a broad freedom of choice of law
within the European internal market: market participants can volunteer being
subjected to the qualification standards of a different Member State and can
thus operate throughout Europe under the laws of their State of origin, pro-
vided they fulfil these standards. Due to this freedom of choice of law to which
mandatory requirements of public interest and the prohibition of abusive
arrangements only set boundaries in exceptional cases, the principle of mutual
recognition creates a much bigger social explosive force in the field of the
freedom of services and of establishment than in that of the free movement
of goods. Contrary to the obligation to recognize foreign spirits regardless of
their alcohol content (Cassis de Dijon), the import of other Member States’
social standards or the immigration of corporations that make use of an overly
permissive foreign legal form can indeed become a political issue. Since the
principle of mutual recognition relies on the Member States’ mutual confi-
nies’ Freedom of Establishment after the ECJ Cartesio Judgement”, 10 EBOR (2009),
595-625, at 620 et seq.
89 Examples for provisions susceptible of an analogy can be found in Bayer/Schmidt,
“Grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung und grenzüberschreitende Restrukturierungen
nach MoMiG, Cartesio und Trabrennbahn”, 173 ZHR (2009), 735-774, at 757 et
seq.; Teichmann, “Cartesio: Die Freiheit zum formwechselnden Wegzug”, (2009) ZIP,
393-404, at 403.
90 Author’s inquiry at the EU publications office (January 2012).
ECFR 1/2016 The Principle of Mutual Recognition 53
Bereitgestellt von | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München Universitätsbibliothek (LMU)
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 06.12.18 16:02
dence in the quality of their national legislation, the current debt crisis thus
poses a danger that is not to be underestimated. For if this crisis develops into a
crisis of confidence that transcends fiscal policies – as, for instance, Joachim
Gauck concludes in his speech on the prospects for the European idea91 – the
willingness to recognize products, service providers and corporations that do
not comply with own but rather qualification standards of a different Member
State will decrease sooner or later; this particularly applies to cases in which
the public no longer views the other Member State as an equal partner, but
rather as a bail-out candidate and thus as a financial burden. The debt crisis
therefore not only endangers the common currency project, but also the proj-
ect of a common internal market.
91 Accessible online at http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/EN/Joa-
chimGauck/Reden/2013/130222-Europe.html (last visited 22 Feb. 2013).
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